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Abstract—In this paper, we address the finite Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) Diversity-Multiplexing Tradeoff (DMT) of the Mul-
tiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) wiretap channel, where
a Zero-Forcing (ZF) transmit scheme, that intends to send the
secret information in the orthogonal space of the eavesdropper
channel, is used. First, we introduce the secrecy multiplexing gain
at finite-SNR that generalizes the definition at high-SNR. Then,
we provide upper and lower bounds on the outage probability
under secrecy constraint, from which secrecy diversity gain
estimates of ZF are derived. Through asymptotic analysis, we
show that the upper bound underestimates the secrecy diversity
gain, whereas the lower bound is tight at high-SNR, and thus its
related diversity gain estimate is equal to the actual asymptotic
secrecy diversity gain of the MIMO wiretap channel.
Index Terms—Diversity-Multiplexing tradeoff, finite-SNR, Se-
crecy outage probability, Secrecy capacity, MIMO wiretap, Zero-
forcing transmit scheme.
I. Introduction
The wiretap channel in which a source communicates with a
receiver through a discrete, memoryless channel (DMC) and a
wire-tapper observes the output of this channel via another
DMC, has been introduced by Wyner [1]. In this seminal
work, it has been shown that if the physical channel to the
eavesdropper is noisier than the channel to the legitimate
receiver, then there exists an encoding-decoding scheme such
that reliable communication with perfect-secrecy is possible
(without the use of any encryption key). Motivated by this
positive result, many other authors have recently addressed
the impact of fading on secure communications. For instance,
the effect of fading on secure communication for single-
antenna wiretap and broadcast channels has been studied in
[2]–[4] where the secrecy-capacity along with the optimal
power allocation and/or rate-adaptation strategies at the source
have been derived under different Channel State Information
(CSI) assumptions. The secrecy-capacity of a multiple-antenna
wiretap channel, with fixed channel matrices (that are hence
known to the transmitter) has been addressed recently in [5]–
[13].
While the ergodic capacity is meaningful in fast-fading
regime, where the codeword length spans many coherence
periods, it is unfortunately unachievable in slow-fading regime,
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where the channel remains constant during the transmission of
the codeword [14]. In communication under secrecy constraint,
the need for outage arises when 1) the transmitter does not
have full CSI about the main channel or the eavesdroppers
channel or 2) the transmitter has full CSI but is subject to
delay constraints. Therefore, resorting to an outage analysis in
order to derive performance limits of communication systems
is the only option. To this end, it has been shown in, e.g.,
[15]–[17] that in a quasi-static fading channel and in contrast
to the Gaussian channel, secure communication is possible
even if the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the main
channel is less than that of the wire-tapper (or one of the wire-
tappers in a multiple eavesdroppers case as discussed in [18]).
Moreover, if a high level of outage is to be tolerated, then the
outage secrecy rate of the fading channel can even be higher
than the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel for
similar average SNR levels.
A more global performance measure of a Multiple Input
Multiple Output (MIMO) channel potential at high-SNR is the
diversity-multiplexing tradeoff (DMT) of Zheng and Tse [19].
In a seminal work, they showed that in a MIMO channel, both
the diversity gain and the multiplexing gain can be achieved
with an optimal tradeoff. This tradeoff is a high-SNR char-
acterization of the maximum diversity gain available at each
multiplexing gain. Recently, the high-SNR secrecy DMT of a
MIMO wiretap channel has been investigated in [20], where it
has been shown that when all terminals perfectly know all the
channels, a Zero-Forcing (ZF) transmit scheme that intends
to send the secret information in the orthogonal space of
the eavesdropper channel, is asymptotically (at infinite SNR)
DMT-optimal.
At low to moderate SNR (typically 3 − 20 dB), where
no secrecy constraint is considered, it has been shown that
the asymptotic DMT is an optimistic upper bound on the
finite-SNR DMT [21]. Indeed, the achievable diversity gains
at realistic SNRs are significantly lower than the asymptotic
values. From a communication theoretical point of view, the
finite-SNR framework also emphasizes an important open
problem: How to design communication schemes that are not
only optimal at high-SNR, but more importantly at finite-SNR
too. The aim of this paper is to analyze the finite-SNR DMT
of ZF transmit scheme under secrecy constraint, where all
terminals have perfect CSI. Section II presents the system
model and introduces the related definitions. In section III,
outage analysis is provided. Upper and lower bounds on the
secrecy outage probability of ZF transmit scheme and their
respective diversity gain estimates are presented in section IV.
We then analyze asymptotic behavior of the derived results in
section V. Results related to a Gaussian approximation of ZF
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performances are reported in section VI. Numerical results are
reported in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. ChannelModel and Related definitions
We consider a Gaussian wiretap MIMO channel in which
the source attends to communicate confidential messages w
using Nt transmit antennas to the destination with Nm receive
antennas in the presence of an eavesdropper with Ne receive
antennas. The outputs at both the legitimate destination and the
eavesdropper, at symbol time index i = 1, . . . , L, are expressed,
respectively by: 
ym(i) = Hmx(i) + nm(i)
ye(i) = Hex(i) + ne(i)
(1)
where x(i) ∈ CNt is the transmitted signal, and Hm ∈ CNm×Nt ,
He ∈ CNe×Nt represent the main channel and the wiretap
channel gains, respectively; and nm(i) ∈ CNm , ne(i) ∈ CNe are
circularly symmetric white Gaussian noises with covariance
matrices E[nm(i)nm(i)†] = INm and E[ne(i)ne(i)†] = INe . We
first assume that Hm and He are fixed and deterministic
matrices and that they are both known at the transmitter and
the eavesdropper. We also assume that Hm is known at the
legitimate receiver. The source is constrained according to an
average power constraint:
1
L
L∑
i=1
E
[
‖x(i)‖2
]
≤ η, (2)
where η is the mean SNR per channel use at each receive
antenna. We assume that CSI is available at both receivers
and at the transmitter as well. The level of uncertainty about
the message w at the eavesdropper is measured by the equiv-
ocation rate defined by:
Re ≔
1
L
H(w | y(L)e ) (3)
where H(w | y) is the conditional entropy of w given y and
y(L)e = (ye(1), . . . , ye(L)). The higher the equivocation rate is,
the smaller is the knowledge of the eavesdropper about the
source. We focus on a constant secrecy rate transmission for
which R = Re. A rate R is an achievable secrecy rate if for
all ǫ > 0, there exists an encoder-decoder (2LR, L, Pe) for
which 2LR represents the number of messages to be sent to the
destination, Re ≥ R − ǫ and Pe ≤ ǫ, where Pe is the average
error probability defined by:
Pe =
1
2LR
2LR∑
w=1
Pr{w , wˆ}, (4)
where wˆ is the output of the decoder at the intended receiver
as a result of observing y(L)m . Furthermore, the secrecy capacity
is given by: Cs ≔ sup
R∈Rs
R, where Rs is the set of achievable
secrecy rates. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel in nats per channel use (npcu) is given by [8]–[10]:
Cs = max
tr (Qx)≤η
[
Ψ(Qx, Hm) − Ψ(Qx, He)
]+
, (5)
where Ψ(Q, H) = log det
(
HQH† + I
)
. An achievability
scheme of (5) is described as follows: Let Rs = Cs − δ be
the secrecy rate, for an arbitrary small δ > 0. To transmit one
of the 2LRs equally likely messages w ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , 2LRs
}
, the
sender employs 2LRs codes, Cw, w = 1, 2, . . . , 2LRs . Each code
Cw contains 2L(Ψ(Qx ,He)−ǫ) Gaussian codewords x(L) of length
L symbols drawn from CN (0, Q). To encode a message w,
a codeword x(L) is chosen uniformly at random from Cw and
is transmitted through the channel, using Nt antennas. By a
random coding argument, it can be shown that there exists at
least one such a codebook with an arbitrary small Pe and with
the equivocation rate Re arbitrary close to Rs, as L → ∞ [1],
[22, Section II.B].
Next, we consider a quasi-static fading model in which
Hm and He in (1) have now independent and identically-
distributed complex Gaussian entries with zero-mean and unit-
variance. The notions of secrecy capacity is still meaningful
if the matrices are known to all terminals. However, It loses
significance when either the matrices are unknown or the
transmitter has to fix a target rate due to delay constraints. In
the later case, it is clear that no matter how small the secrecy
rate at which we want to communicate, there is a non zero
probability that the pair (Hm,He) is not able to support it. The
performance limit in this case may be captured through an
outage analysis as argued in Section III.
For an SNR-dependent secrecy rate Rs(S NR), the secrecy
multiplexing and diversity gains are defined by:
rs =
Rs
log(1 + g · η) (6)
ds(rs, η) = −η∂
(
log Pe(rs, η))
∂η
, (7)
where g is an array gain that is chosen to guarantee a fair
comparison of the outage performance with secrecy constraint,
across different antenna configurations, at low to medium SNR
values. Indeed, by considering the MIMO secrecy rate at low
SNR, it has been shown in [23] that at low SNR, the secrecy
capacity can be expressed by:
Cs =
[
λmax
(
H†mHm − H†eHe
)]+ · η + o(η), (8)
where λmax
(
H†mHm − H†eHe
)
is the maximum eigenvalue
of H†mHm − H†eHe. Thus g is chosen such that
g = E
{[
λmax
(
H†mHm − H†eHe
)]+}
. Note that if
λmax
(
H†mHm − H†eHe
)
≤ 0, then H†mHm  H†eHe and thus the
main channel is a degraded version of the eavesdropper one,
which implies that the secrecy capacity is equal to zero and
so is the secrecy multiplexing gain rs in (6). As defined in (6),
the secrecy multiplexing gain rs provides an indication as to
how the secrecy rate scales with the capacity of an Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel with an array gain
g, as the SNR changes. Note that for a constant secrecy
multiplexing gain, the secrecy rate increases as the SNR
increases. Hence, the secrecy multiplexing gain rs provides
an indication of the sensitivity of a secure rate adaptation
strategy as the SNR changes. On the other hand, the secrecy
diversity gain ds(rs, η) of a secure rate adaptive system, with
a fixed multiplexing gain rs at SNR η, represents the negative
slope of the log-log plot of the average error probability
versus SNR. It can then be used to estimate the additional
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SNR required to decrease the average error probability
Pe (rs, η) by a specific amount for a given multiplexing gain
rs. This interpretation of the diversity gain is meaningful no
matter how Pe scales with η. However, as the SNR η tends
toward infinity, the diversity gain in (7) coincides with the
asymptotic (at high-SNR) one as defined in [19]. Recall that
the finite-SNR multiplexing and diversity gains have been
first introduced in [24] to estimate the performance limits of
multiple antenna communication systems, but without secrecy
constraint. By properly extending the notion of finite-SNR
DMT to secure communication, we intend to provide an
estimate of its performance limits, not asymptotically [20],
but at realistic SNR values.
Finally, we consider perfect-secrecy communication in
which we let the size of the sub-codebooks Cw varies with
the eavesdropper channel, i.e., |Cw| = 2L Ψ(Qx ,He). That is, to
ensure a secrecy rate Rs, the transmission rate at the source is
equal to:
R = Rs + Ψ(Qx, He). (9)
III. Outage Analysis and Related Background
A. Background
Recall that in a quasi-static channel model without secrecy
constraint, a detection error happens as a result of three
events: 1) the channel matrix is atypically ill-conditioned, 2)
the additive noise is atypically large, or 3) some codewords
are atypically close together. For large coherence block L
(which we assume in this paper) and using capacity-achieving
codes, the randomness in the last two events is averaged out,
and thus we can focus only on the bad channel event. That
is, the error probability without secrecy constraint is mainly
dominated by the outage events [19]. Now, introducing the
secrecy constraint engenders a new error event at the legitimate
receiver corresponding to the case where both the legitimate
and the eavesdropper can decode the message correctly, and
thus the secrecy is not achieved [25]. The later error event
may be defined by:
P
{
secrecy is not achieved} = P
{
1
L
H(w | y(L)e ) < Rs
}
.
Hence, in order to compute the error probability of the scheme,
we only need to analyze the probability that the main channel
is in outage or the secrecy is not achieved. That is:
Pe = P
{
main channel is in outage or secrecy is not achieved} .
(10)
Note that (10) is rather general and does not depend on the
coding scheme used at the transmitter. Therefore, in order to
analyze the finite-SNR diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of the
MIMO wiretap channel, a characterization of the main channel
outage and “secrecy is not achieved” events is required.
When perfect CSI is available at all terminals, the outage
probability has been characterized at high-SNR in [20]. The
asymptotic secrecy DMT has been derived consequently. In
particular, it has been shown that at high-SNR and under
perfect CSI at all terminals, if Ne < Nt, then the secrecy
DMT is a piecewise linear function joining the points (l, d∞s (l)),
where l = 0, . . . ,min (Nt − Ne, Nm), with d∞s (l) given by:
d∞s (l) = (Nt − Ne − l)(Nm − l). (11)
If on the contrary Ne ≥ Nt, then the secrecy DMT reduces to
the single point (0, 0). From a DMT perspective, the MIMO
wiretap channel is equivalent to a reduced MIMO channel with
(Nt − Ne) and Nm transmit and receive antennas, respectively.
As the error probability is generally log-concave [26], [27], the
diversity gain is an increasing function in SNR. Therefore,
the finite-SNR secrecy diversity gain ds is equal to zero
if Ne ≥ Nt. Next, we assume that Ne < Nt and we let
m = min (Nt − Ne, Nm) and k = max (Nt − Ne, Nm), for notation
convenience.
B. Outage Analysis
Since in our scheme, to transmit messages securely, we have
used a family of capacity-achieving codes over the wiretap
channel (please see our achievability scheme above), then by
[25, Theorem 1], the secrecy is guaranteed and (10) becomes:
Pe = P
{
main channel is in outage
}
. (12)
An outage occurs if the actual channel realization (Hm,He)
belongs to O1, defined by: O1 =
{
Hm,He | Ψ(Qx,Hm) < R
}
.
Using (9), the main channel outage probability may be ex-
pressed by:
Pout = infQx0,tr (Qx)≤η
P
[
Ψ(Qx,Hm) − Ψ(Qx,He) < Rs
]
. (13)
Since the structure of the optimal covariance matrix is gen-
erally not known for an arbitrary SNR, characterizing Pout is
still an insolvable problem. Nevertheless, any choice of Qx  0
that satisfies the trace constraint, provides an upper bound on
the outage probability. Motivated by the results at high-SNR
in [20] where it has been shown that a ZF transmit scheme is
DMT-optimal, we investigate next the finite-SNR performance
of the later scheme. Recall that a ZF transmit scheme consists
of transmitting the secret information in the null space of the
eavesdropper channel. That is, the transmitter sends a vector
x = Au, where A is such that H⊥e = AA†, where H⊥e is the
orthogonal matrix of He, and where u is a Gaussian vector with
covariance ηNt−Ne INt−Ne . This choice of x provides the following
upper bound on the outage probability:
Pout ≤ PZFout, (14)
where PZFout = P
[
Ψ
(
Heq
)
< Rs
]
, with ψ
(
Heq
)
=
log det
(
I + ηNt−Ne HeqH
†
eq
)
and with Heq = (HmA) an Nm ×
(Nt − Ne) channel matrix with i.i.d. complex Gaussian entries
with zero-mean and unit-variance. PZFout represents the outage
probability of an equivalent MIMO channel with (Nt − Ne) and
Nm transmit and receive antennas, respectively, and where the
input is Gaussian with covariance ηNt−Ne INt−Ne . From [19], we
know that the PZFout achieves the high-SNR DMT of this MIMO
channel, which is equal to d∞s given by (11), and thus ZF is
also asymptotically optimal with respect to the secrecy DMT.
At finite-SNR, we expect ZF to induce a power loss that may
translate to a decrease of its secrecy diversity gain.
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IV. ZF Outage Analysis At Finite-SNR
In this section, upper and lower bounds on the secrecy
outage probability of ZF transmit scheme are derived. In order
to characterize the secrecy diversity gain of this transmission
scheme, these bounds are then used to provide insightful
diversity estimates.
A. Upper Bound on ZF Secrecy Outage Probability
Our results is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Upper bound on PZFout): An upper bound on the
outage probability of ZF transmit scheme is given by:
PZFout ≤
m∏
l=1
Γinc(ξ(rs), k−l+1)
1 −
m∏
l=1
[
1 − Γinc(ξ(bl), k − l + 1)
Γinc(ξ(rs), k − l + 1)
] ,
(15)
where Γinc is the incomplete Gamma function
defined by Γinc(x, a) = 1(a−1)!
∫ x
0 t
a−1e−tdt, where
ξ (x) = Nt−Ne
η
((1 + gη)x − 1) and where bl, l = 1, . . . ,m, are
arbitrary positive coefficients that satisfy 0 ≤ bm ≤ . . . ≤ b1
along with rs =
∑m
l=1 bl.
Proof: Let Heq = QR be the orthogonal triangular (QR)
decomposition of the matrix HmA, where Q is an Nm × Nm
unitary matrix and where R is an Nm × (Nt − Ne) upper trian-
gular matrix with independent entries. The square magnitudes
of the diagonal entries of R, |Rl,l|2, are chi-square distributed
with 2(k − l + 1) degrees of freedom, l = 1, . . . ,m. The off-
diagonal elements of R are i.i.d. Gaussian variables, with zero
mean and unit variance. Using the fact that det(I + RR†) ≥∏m
l=1
(
1 +
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
, the following lower bound is obtained:
Ψ
(
Heq
)
≥
m∑
l=1
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
. (16)
Then PZFout can be upper bounded as follows:
PZFout ≤ P
[ m∑
l=1
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
< Rs
]
= P
[
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
< Rs, l = 1, . . . ,m
]
−P
[ m∑
l=1
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
≥ Rs;
log
(
1 +
η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
≤ Rs, l = 1, . . . ,m
]
≤ P
[
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
< Rs, l = 1, . . . ,m
]
−P
[
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
≤ Rs;
bl log (1 + gη) ≤ log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2
)
, l = 1, . . . ,m
]
=
m∏
l=1
Γinc(ξ (rs) , k − l + 1)
−
m∏
l=1
(
Γinc(ξ (rs) , k − l + 1) − Γinc(ξ (bl) , k − l + 1)
)
(17)
where (17) follows because
∣∣∣Rl,l∣∣∣2 is chi-square distributed
with 2 (k − l + 1) degrees of freedom. From (17), (15) follows
immediately.
The upper bound in (15) is minimized over all bl, l = 1, . . . ,m,
that satisfy 0 ≤ bm ≤ . . . ≤ b1 along with rs =
∑m
l=1 bl to obtain
a better result. It turns out that this minimization problem is
convex and can be easily solved using standard optimization
algorithms. Furthermore, even without such an optimization,
the upper bound in (15) involves Γinc (x, N) functions that are
now well studied and are built-in functions in most popular
computing softwares. Moreover, since the asymptotic behavior
of Γinc (x, N) as x −→ 0, or x −→ ∞ is well understood, the
upper bound in (15) is analytically tractable asymptotically. As
evidence of our claim, we provide below some results related
to this upper bound.
Corollary 1 (Secrecy Diversity Gain Estimate ˆdUs ): Let
αl = Γinc(ξ(rs), k − l + 1), βl = Γinc(ξ(bl), k − l + 1) and fl(x)
defined by:
fl(x) =
(
(1 + gη)x − xgη(1 + gη)x−1 − 1
) ξ(x)k−le−ξ(x)/(k − l)!
Γinc(ξ(x), k − l + 1) .(18)
Then, a secrecy diversity gain estimate ˆdUs (U for related to
the upper bound on PZFout) of ZF transmission scheme is given
by:
ˆdUs (rs, η) =
Nt − Ne
η
m∑
l=1
[
fl(rs)+ βl
αl
(
fl(bl)− fl(rs)
) ∏
k,l
(
1 − βk
αk
)
1 −
m∏
k=1
(
1 − βk
αk
)
]
.
(19)
Proof: The proof follows directly from (15) and (7).
The secrecy diversity gain estimate ˆdUs (rs, η) in (19) is a finite
sum that can be easily evaluated.
B. Lower Bound on ZF Secrecy Outage Probability
Our result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Lower Bound on PZFout): A lower bound on the
outage probability of ZF transmit scheme is given by:
PZFout ≥
m∏
l=1
Γinc(ξ(al), k + m − 2l + 1), (20)
where al, l = 1, . . . ,m, are arbitrary positive coefficients that
satisfy 0 ≤ am ≤ . . . ≤ a1 along with rs =
∑m
l=1 al.
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, and using the
fact that det(T) ≤ ∏
l
Tl,l, for any nonnegative-definite matrix
T, the following upper bound is obtained:
Ψ
(
Heq
)
≤
m∑
l=1
log
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∆l
)
, (21)
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where ∆l =
m∑
k=l
|Rl,k |2, l = 1, . . . ,m, is the lth diagonal entry of
RR†. Then PZFout can be lower bounded as follows:
PZFout ≥ P
[ m∏
l=1
(
1 + η
Nt − Ne
∆l
)
< (1 + gη)rs
]
≥ P
[
(1 + η
Nt − Ne
∆l) < (1 + gη)al , l = 1, . . . ,m
]
=
m∏
l=1
Prob (∆l < ξ(al)) ,
from which the lower bound in (20) follows because ∆l is chi-
square distributed with 2(k + m − 2l + 1) degrees of freedom.
The lower bound in (20) is then maximized over all al, l =
1, . . . ,m, that satisfy 0 ≤ am ≤ . . . ≤ a1 along with rs =
∑m
l=1 al
to obtain a better result.
Corollary 2 (Secrecy Diversity Gain Estimate ˆdLs ): A
secrecy diversity gain estimate ˆdLs of ZF transmission scheme
is given by:
ˆdLs (rs, η) =
Nt − Ne
η
m∑
l=1
f2l−m(al) (22)
Proof: The proof follows directly from (20) and (7).
Note that the secrecy diversity gain estimate ˆdLs (rs, η) in (22)
is again a finite sum that can be easily evaluated. To conclude
this section, few remarks are worthwhile:
1) When Nt − Ne = 1 or Nm = 1, the upper bound
(15) and the lower bound (20) coincide, the secrecy
outage probability of ZF transmit scheme is completely
characterized at all SNR values, and the secrecy diversity
gain is equal to:
ds(rs, η) = Nt − Ne
η
f1(rs). (23)
2) From the proof of Theorem 2, it is easy to see that PZFout ≤∏m
l=1 Γinc(ξ(rs), k − l + 1). This “naive” upper bound is
however loose as it fails to provide any positive diversity
gain estimate for rs ≥ 1 (cf. Appendix B for details). The
upper bound in (15) provides better results.
3) By (14), the upper bound in (15) is also an upper bound
on the outage probability of the MIMO wiretap channel.
V. Asymptotic Analysis
In this section, we analyze the derived results in section
IV, at low secrecy multiplexing gain regime (rs → 0), which
captures the maximum secrecy diversity gain estimates for a
given SNR value, and at high-SNR regime (η → ∞.), which
characterizes the asymptotic DMT achieved by the upper and
the lower bounds reported in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,
respectively.
Corollary 3 (Maximum Diversity Estimates): The
maximum secrecy diversity estimates provided by ˆdUs
and ˆdLs are respectively given by:
ˆdU,maxs = lim
rs→0
dUs (rs)
= m k
(
1 − m − 1
2k
) (
1 − gη(1 + gη) ln (1 + gη)
)
(24)
ˆdL,maxs = lim
rs→0
dLs (rs)
= m k
(
1 − gη(1 + gη) ln (1 + gη)
)
(25)
Proof: For convenience, the proof is presented in Ap-
pendix A
By letting η tends toward zero in (24) and (25), it can be
seen that ˆdU,maxs underestimates the maximum diversity gain
at high-SNR, which is equal to mk; whereas, ˆdL,maxs matches
the later asymptotic maximum diversity gain. In fact, at high-
SNR regime, ˆdUs underestimates the diversity gain at any
multiplexing gain, whereas, ˆdLs matches the asymptotic secrecy
diversity gain at all multiplexing gains, as stated below.
Theorem 3 (High-SNR Estimates of Secrecy Diversity Gain):
At high-SNR, we have:
lim
η→∞
dUs (rs) =

m k
(
1 − m−12k
)
−
m k
(
1 − m−12k
)
− m−1m∑
l=1
1
k−l+1
 rs
if rs ∈ [0, 1[
1
m∑
l=1
1
k−l+1
(m − rs) if rs ∈ [1,m]
(26)
lim
η→∞
dLs (rs) = d∞s (rs) (27)
Proof: For convenience, the proof is presented in Ap-
pendix B
VI. ZF Outage Analysis Using A Gaussian Approximation
Instead of the bounding techniques used in section V, we
present in this section performance of ZF transmit scheme
using a Gaussian approximation. Gaussian approximation of
the channel mutual information Ψ
(
Heq
)
, initially proposed by
Smith and Shafi in [28], has been widely used since then, albeit
in a different context, to provide a more tractable analytical
tool. While this approximation does not provide much insight
as to how secure DMT of ZF transmit scheme varies with
SNR and with the multiplexing gain rs, the accuracy ot the
results as shown by simulation (cf. section VII), especially
at finite-SNR, and the analytical tractability, both justify its
presentation in this section.
A. Outage Probability Approximation
Recall that the mean µeq and the variance σ2eq of Ψ
(
Heq
)
have been derived in integral forms by Telatar in [29] and by
Smith and Shafi in [28], respectively. Kang and Alouini suc-
ceeded to obtain these quantities in closed forms [30, eqs. (34)
and (35)]. Introducing the generalized hypergeometric function
pFq(a; b; z), the Meijer’s G function Gm,np,q
(
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a1, . . . , apb1, . . . , bq
)
, and
the exponential integral function En(z) [31], it can be shown
that their expressions may be further simplified as shown at
the top of the next page, where the Gamma function in (28) is
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µeq =
m−1∑
n=0
e1/η(k − m + n)!
n!(k − m)!2
2n∑
l=0
(k − m)!Γ(l − n)
Γ(−n)l!
×
k−m+l+1∑
q=1
η−1−l+m−k+qΓ
(
−1 − l + m − k + q, 1/η
)
×3 F2
(
−n,−l,−l + m − k; 1 + n − l, 1 − m + k;−1
)
(28)
σ2eq =
m−1∑
n=0
e1/η(k − m + n)!
n!(k − m)!2
2n∑
l=0
(
2(k − m)!Γ(l − n)
(k − m + l)!l!Γ(−n) × 3F2(−n,−l,−l + m − k; n − l + 1,−m + k + 1;−1)
×
l−m+k∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
l − m + k
q
)
G4,03,4
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ q + 1, q + 1, q + 1l − m + k + 1, q, q, q
)
−
m−1∑
i=0

m−1∑
j=0
 e
2/η(k − m + i)!(k − m + j)!
i! j!(k − m + 1)!4

i∑
n=0

j∑
l=0
 (k − m)!
2(k − m + n + l)!Γ(n − i)Γ(l − j)
n!l!(k − m + n)!(k − m + l)!Γ(−i)Γ(− j) ×
n+l−m+k+1∑
q=1
En+l−m+k−q+2
(
1
η
)


2
 (29)
defined by: Γ (a, z) =
∫ ∞
z
ta−1e−t dt. Using the above Gaussian
approximation, the upper bound in (14) may be approximated
by:
PZFout ≈ Q
(
µeq − Rs√
σ2eq
)
, (30)
where Q (·) represents the Gaussian Q-function.
B. Secure DMT Approximation
Using (30) along with (7), an estimate of ZF secure diversity
gain ˆdGs (rs, η) (G for Gaussian) can be expressed by:
ˆdGs (rs, η) =
η
Q
(
µeq−Rs√
σ2eq
) 1√
2π
e
− (Rs−µeq )
2
2σ2eq h(rs, η), (31)
where h(rs, η) is defined by:
h(rs, η) =
(Rs − µeq)(σ2eq)′
2(σ2eq)3/2
−
R′s − µ′eq
(σ2eq)1/2
,
where f ′ represents the derivative of f with respect to η.
Expressions of R′s, µ′eq and (σ2eq)′ are given by (51), (52) and
(53), respectively, in Appendix C.
Using the asymptotic representation of the Q-function:
Q(x) = e−x2/2
(
1
2
√
πx
+ o
(
1
x
))
, letting t = µeq−Rs√
σ2eq
for convenience,
and applying the log (·) function to the RHS of (30), we have
at high-SNR:
log (Q (t)) = − t
2
2
+ o(t). (32)
But at high-SNR, t=˙ (m − rs) log (η),1 which combined with
(32) give:
log (Q (t))=˙ − (rs − m)
2
2
log (η)2. (33)
That is, the asymptotic secrecy diversity gain estimate pro-
vided by the Gaussian approximation diverges for all multi-
plexing gains.
1The notation f =˙g means lim
S NR→∞
log f
log S NR = limS NR→∞
log g
log S NR
VII. Numerical results
In this section, numerical results of ZF transmit scheme
for a MIMO wiretap channel with (Nt, Nm, Ne) = (3, 2, 1) and
(Nt, Nm, Ne) = (4, 2, 1), are presented. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, ZF
secrecy outage probability obtained using computer simula-
tion, along with the upper, the lower bounds and the Gaussian
approximation given respectively by (15), (20) and (30), are
plotted for secrecy multiplexing gains rs = 0.5 and rs = 1
and for (Nt, Nm, Ne) = (3, 2, 1) and (Nt, Nm, Ne) = (4, 2, 1),
respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the curves
corresponding to the bounds follow the same shape as the
exact curves for all SNR values, supporting the results reported
in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The lower bound curves are
however closer to the exact curves than the upper bound ones,
as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The Gaussian approximation
curves are enough accurate to approximate the ZF secrecy
outage probability at low SNR (below 12 dB in Fig. 1 and up
to 20 dB in Fig. 2). However, as SNR increases, a discrepancy
between the Gaussian approximation curves and the curves
obtained by simulations shows up at high-SNR, suggesting
that the Gaussian approximation is somehow too pessimistic
to be useful in this case. The secrecy diversity gain and its
estimates given by (19), (22) and (31) are reported in Fig.
3 and Fig. 4 for different antenna configurations and different
SNR values. In these figures, it can be seen that the asymptotic
secrecy diversity gain provides an optimistic upper bound
on the secrecy diversity gain at finite-SNR. Furthermore, the
secrecy diversity estimates provided by the upper bound is
closer to the exact secrecy diversity gain at high multiplexing
gains (rs ≥ 1). As the multiplexing gain decreases, the secrecy
diversity gain estimate provided by the lower bound is more
accurate and converges to the exact curves as rs → 0. In
both Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the secrecy diversity gain estimate
provided by the Gaussian approximation is the closest to the
exact curves for almost all multiplexing gains which again
justify the presentation of this approximation in this work.
Also shown in Fig. 4, is the asymptotic (at high-SNR) diversity
estimate ˆdUs . Finally, the asymptotic behavior of the diversity
estimates is illustrated in Fig. 5, where the diversity estimate
curves are plotted for an SNR η = 60 dB. Figure 5 confirms
the results presented in Theorem 3.
REZKI AND ALOUINI: SECURE DIVERSITY-MULTIPLEXING TRADEOFF OF ZERO-FORCING TRANSMIT SCHEME AT FINITE-SNR 7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2010
−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
SNR per receive antenna: η
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y:
 P
o
u
t
 
 
Exact ZF secret outage probability (simulation)
Upper bound on ZF secret outage probability given by (15)
Lower bound on ZF secret outage probability given by (20)
Gaussian approximation of ZF secret outage probability given by (30)
r
s
=1
r
s
=0.5
Fig. 1. Comparison of ZF secrecy outage probability, the upper bound given
by (15), the lower bound given by (20) and the Gaussian approximation given
by (30); for different secrecy multiplexing gains rs and for a wiretap channel
with (Nt , Nm, Ne) = (4, 2, 1).
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Fig. 2. Comparison of ZF secrecy outage probability, the upper bound given
by (15), the lower bound given by (20) and the Gaussian approximation given
by (30); for different secrecy multiplexing gains rs and for a wiretap channel
with (Nt , Nm, Ne) = (3, 2, 1).
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, the finite-SNR DMT of ZF transmit scheme
under secrecy constraint has been analyzed. Performance lim-
its of such a transmit scheme have been characterized in terms
of secrecy outage probability, where analytically tractable
upper and lower bounds have been derived. Related secrecy
diversity gain estimates have been provided. These diversity
estimates give insight as to how the performance of ZF varies
with SNR and with the secrecy multiplexing gain. Through
asymptotic analysis, we characterize ZF transmit scheme in
some limit conditions. Motivated by its accuracy, we have
also presented performance of the Gaussian approximation
and its related diversity estimates. Simulation results have
been provided to confirm the accuracy of the finite-SNR
DMT characterizations. Furthermore, beside the fact that the
diversity estimates can be used to characterize the potential
limit of a particular transmit scheme, it can also be used, for
instance, as a metric to improve error performance of certain
adaptive communications under secrecy constraint.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of ZF secrecy diversity gain obtained by simulation and
its estimates ˆdUs (rs, η), ˆdLs (rs, η) and ˆdGs (rs, η), given by (19), (22) and (30),
respectively; for an SNR value η = 10 dB, and for a wiretap channel with
(Nt ,Nm ,Ne) = (3, 2, 1).
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Fig. 4. Comparison of ZF secrecy diversity gain obtained by simulation and
its estimates ˆdUs (rs, η), ˆdLs (rs, η) and ˆdGs (rs, η), given by (19), (22) and (30),
respectively; for an SNR value η = 5 dB, and for a wiretap channel with
(Nt ,Nm ,Ne) = (4, 2, 1).
Appendix A
Proof of Corollary 3
First, note that since rs tends toward zero, then so are all
bl, l = 1, . . . ,m. Then, it is easy to verify that:
lim
rs→0
βl
αl
(
fl(bl) − fl(rs)
) ∏
k,l
(
1 − βk
αk
)
1 −
m∏
k=1
(
1 − βk
αk
) = 0. (34)
This follows from the facts that:
0 ≤ βl
αl
∏
k,l
(
1 − βk
αk
)
1 −
m∏
k=1
(
1 − βk
αk
) ≤ 1, (35)
along with:
lim
bl→0
fl(bl)=
(
1 − gη(1 + gη) log (1 + gη)
)
(k − l + 1) (36)
= lim
rs→0
fl(rs). (37)
Equation (34) implies that this term does not provide any
diversity contribution at low secrecy multiplexing gain. Using
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Fig. 5. Behavior of ZF diversity estimates ˆdUs (rs, η) and ˆdLs (rs, η), for an
SNR value η = 60 dB and for a wiretap channel with (Nt, Nm, Ne) = (4, 2, 1).
(34) and (37), (24) is immediately obtained. To obtain (25), a
similar approach can be used.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 can be proved in two different ways. The first
one analyzes the expressions of the upper and the lower bounds
given by (19) and (22), respectively, at high-SNR regime. The
second one achieves the same goal by deriving the asymptotic
behavior of the diversity estimates in Corollary 1 and Corollary
2, respectively, as SNR tends toward infinity. We will present
these two approaches to prove (26), the proof of (27) follows
along similar lines.
1) Method 1: Analyzing the upper bound (19) at high-SNR
We distinguish two cases: rs < 1 and rs ≥ 1.
• rs < 1
First, note that as η → ∞, ξ (rs) → 0 and so is ξ (bl), l =
1, . . . ,m. On the other hand, since around zero, Γinc (·, ·) may
be approximated by: Γinc (x, N) = xNN! + o
(
xN
)
, then we have:
αl =
1
(k − l + 1)!
(
(Nt − Ne) grsηrs−1
)k−l+1
+ o
(
η(rs−1)(k−l+1)
)
(38)
βl =
1
(k − l + 1)!
(
(Nt − Ne) gblηbl−1
)k−l+1
+ o
(
η(bl−1)(k−l+1)
)
(39)
βl
αl
= (gη)(bl−rs)(k−l+1) + o
(
η(bl−rs)(k−l+1)
)
(40)
1 −
m∏
l=1
[
1 − βl
αl
] =
m∑
l=1
(gη)(bl−rs)(k−l+1) + o
(
η
max
bl
{(bl−rs)(k−l+1)})
(41)
Moreover, the first term
(∏m
l=1 αl
)
on the right hand side (RHS)
of (15) does not depend on bl’s, and from (38), provides
an asymptotic diversity gain equal to: (1 − rs)∑ml=1 (k − l + 1).
Consequently, at high-SNR, minimizing (15) is equivalent to
minimizing RHS of (41). The problem at hand now reduces
to solving the following minimization problem:
min
bl
∑m
l=1 η
(bl−rs)(k−l+1)
0 ≥ b1 ≥ . . . ≥ bm∑m
l=1 bl = rs
(42)
This problem is convex and can be easily solved by the
Lagrangian method. We skip the details and give below the
optimal solution at high-SNR:
(bl − rs) (k − l + 1) = −δ, (43)
where δ = m−1m∑
l=1
1
k−l+1
rs, for all bl, l = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, the
asymptotic diversity gain provided by the second term on the
RHS of (15) is equal to δ. Summing the two diversity gains,
we have:
lim
η→∞
dUs (rs) = (1 − rs)
m∑
l=1
(k − l + 1) + m − 1
m∑
l=1
1
k−l+1
rs, (44)
for rs ∈ [0, 1[, from which the first relation in (26) is
immediate.
• rs ≥ 1
On the contrary to the first case, when η → ∞, αl tends
toward 1, l = 1, . . . ,m, which implies that the first term(∏m
l=1 αl
)
on the right hand side (RHS) of (15) does not provide
any diversity gain in this case. Hence, minimizing the upper
bound (15) is equivalent to solving the following optimization
problem at high-SNR:
min
bl
∑m
l=1 η
(bl−1)(k−l+1)
0 ≥ b1 ≥ . . . ≥ bm∑m
l=1 bl = rs,
(45)
which can be solved similarly to the first case to obtain the
following optimal solution:
(bl − 1) (k − l + 1) = −γ, (46)
where γ = m−rsm∑
l=1
1
k−l+1
for all bl, l = 1, . . . ,m. Hence, for rs ∈
[1,m], the asymptotic secrecy diversity gain is equal to γ,
which proves the second relation in (26) too.
1) Method 2: Analyzing the diversity estimates in Corollary
1 at high-SNR
We also treat the cases rs < 1 and rs ≥ 1 separately.
• rs < 1
First, it can be easily verified that:
fl(rs)= ηNt − Ne (k − l + 1) (1 − rs) + o (η) (47)
fl(bl)= ηNt − Ne (k − l + 1) (1 − bl) + o (η) . (48)
Thus the diversity contribution of the first term
Nt−Ne
η
∑m
l=1 fl(rs) on the RHS of (19) is equal to
(1 − rs)∑ml=1 (k − l + 1). We are then left to analyze the
second term on the RHS of (19). Combining (40), (41), (47)
and (48), along with tha fact that ∏k,l (1 − βlαl
)
→ 1, as SNR
tends toward infinity, the limit as η → ∞, of the diversity
estimate in (19) can be expressed by:
lim
η→∞
dUs (rs)= (1 − rs)
m∑
l=1
(k − l + 1)
+
∑m
l=1 (rs − bl) (k − l + 1) η(bl−rs)(k−l+1)∑m
l=1 η
(bl−rs)(k−l+1) + o(η).(49)
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R′ =
tNe
1 + Neη
+
rsNm
1 + Nmη
(51)
µ′eq =
m−1∑
k=0
e1/η(n − m + k)!
k!(n − m)!2
2k∑
l=0
Γ(l − k)(n − m)!
Γ(−k)l!
×
n−m+l+1∑
q=1
(
(−l + m − n + q − 1)η−l+m−n+q−2Γ
(
−l + m − n + q − 1, 1
η
)
+
1
e1/ηη
)
× 3F2(−k,−l,−l + m − n; k − l + 1,−m + n + 1;−1)
− e
1/η(n − m + k)!
η2k!(n − m)!2
2k∑
l=0
Γ(l − k)(n − m)!
Γ(−k)l!
l−m+n+1∑
q=1
η−l+m−n+q−1Γ
(
−l + m − n + q − 1, 1
η
)
× 3F2(−k,−l,−l + m − n; k − l + 1,−m + n + 1;−1) (52)
(σ2eq)′ =
m−1∑
k=0
e
1/η(n − m + k)!
(n − m)!2k!
2k∑
l=0
2Γ(l − k)(n − m)!
Γ(−k)(n − m + l)!l!
× 3F2(−k,−l,−l + m − n; k − l + 1,−m + n + 1;−1)
×
l−m+n∑
q=0
− (−1)
q
η
(
qG4,03,4
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ q + 1, q + 1, q + 1l − m + n + 1, q, q, q
)
−G3,02,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ q + 1, q + 1l − m + n + 1, q, q
))
−e
1/η(n − m + k)!
η2(n − m)!2k!
2k∑
l=0
2Γ(l − k)(n − m)!
Γ(−k)(n − m + l)!l!
× 3F2(−k,−l,−l + m − n; k − l + 1,−m + n + 1;−1)
×
l−m+n∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
l − m + n
q
)
G4,03,4
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ q + 1, q + 1, q + 1l − m + n + 1, q, q, q
)
−
m−1∑
i=0

m−1∑
j=0
2e2/η(n − m + i)!(n − m + j)!
η2(n − m)!4i! j!
×

i∑
k=0

j∑
l=0
Γ(k − i)Γ(l − j)(n − m)!2(n − m + k + l)!
Γ(−i)Γ(− j)Γ(k + 1)Γ(l + 1)Γ(k − m + n + 1)Γ(l − m + n + 1)
k+l−m+n+1∑
q=1
Ek+l−m+n−q+2
(
1
η
)

×
η2
i∑
k=0

j∑
l=0
Γ(k − i)Γ(l − j)(n − m)!2(n − m + k + l)!
Γ(−i)Γ(− j)(n − m + k)!(n − m + l)!k!l!
×
k+l−m+n+1∑
q=1
e−1/η − (k + l − m + n − q + 1)Ek+l−m+n−q+2
(
1
η
)
η

−
i∑
k=0

j∑
l=0
Γ(k − i)Γ(l − j)(n − m)!2(n − m + k + l)!
Γ(−i)Γ(− j)(n − m + k)!(n − m + l)!k!l!
k+l−m+n+1∑
q=1
Ek+l−m+n−q+2
(
1
η
)

 (53)
Recall that bl’s in (49) are those that solve (42), and thus by
(43), we have:
lim
η→∞
dUs (rs) = (1 − rs)
m∑
l=1
(k − l + 1) + δ, (50)
from which the first relation in (26) follows.
• rs ≥ 1
To prove (27), we use the fact that when η → ∞, αl tends
toward 1, l = 1, . . . ,m, along with the fact that fl (rs) = o
(
η−N
)
,
for all N ≥ 0. The proof is then completed using similar
machinery than the one utilized in the first case.
Appendix C
Expressions of R′s, µ′eq and (σ2eq)′
Expressions of R′s, µ′eq and (σ2eq)′ are given by (51), (52)
and (53), respectively, at the top of the page.
References
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal,
vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[2] P. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of fading
channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 4687–4698,
Oct. 2008.
[3] Y. Liang, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading
channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2470–2492,
Jun. 2008.
10 IEEE TRANSACTION ON COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. X, XXX 2012
[4] A. Khisti, A. Tchamkerten, and G. Wornell, “Secure broadcasting over
fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2453–
2469, Jun. 2008.
[5] A. Khisti, G. Wornell, A. Wiesel, and Y. Eldar, “On the Gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel,” in Proc. International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT’2007), Nice, France, Jun. 2007, pp. 2471–2475.
[6] L. Zang, W. Trappe, and R. Yates, “Secret communication via multi-
antenna transmission,” in Proc. Conference on Information Sciences and
Systems (CISS’2007), Baltimore, MD, USA, Mar. 2007, pp. 905–910.
[7] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wire-
tap channel,” in Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT’2008), Toronto, ON, Canada, Jul. 2008, pp. 524–528.
[8] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas-
part ii: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[9] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972,
Aug. 2011.
[10] T. Liu and S. Shamai (Shitz), “A note on the secrecy capacity of the
multiple-antenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55,
no. 6, pp. 2547–2553, Jun. 2009.
[11] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “The secrecy capacity region
of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, To appear. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ece.umd.edu/∼ulukus/papers/journal/gaussian-mimo-mr-wt-final.pdf
[12] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 5747–5755, Dec. 2008.
[13] G. Bagherikaram, A. S. Motahari, and A. K. Khandani,
“Secure broadcasting: The secrecy rate region,” Submitted to
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Aug. 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://shannon2.uwaterloo.ca/∼k1/j/{submitted-Ghadamali-Abolfazl.pdf}
[14] D. Tse and P. Viswanath, Fundamentals of wireless communication.
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[15] P. Parada and R. Blahut, “Secrecy capacity of SIMO and slow fading
channels,” in Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT’2005), Adelaide, Australia, Sep. 2005, pp. 2152–2155.
[16] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless
channels,” in Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT’2006), Seattle, Washington, USA, Jul. 2006, pp. 356–360.
[17] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2515–2534, Jun. 2008.
[18] P. Wang, G. Yu, and Z. Zhang, “On the secrecy capacity of fading
wireless channel with multiple eavesdroppers,” in Proc. International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT’2007), Nice, France, Sep. 2007,
pp. 1301–1305.
[19] L. Zheng and D. N. C. Tse, “Diversity and multiplexing: A fundamental
tradeoff in multiple-antenna channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 1073–1096, May 2003.
[20] M. Yuksel and E. Erkip, “Diversity-multiplexing tradeoff for the
multiple-antenna wire-tap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Com-
munications, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 762 –771, march 2011.
[21] R. Narasimhan, “Finite-SNR diversity performance of rate-adaptive
MIMO systems,” in Proc. Global Telecomm. Conf. (GLOBECOM’2005),
St. Louis, MO, USA, 28 Nov.-2 Dec. 2005, pp. 1461– 1465.
[22] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic, and H. Poor, “On the throughput of secure
Hybrid-ARQ protocols for Gaussian block-fading channels,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 1575 –1591, Apr. 2009.
[23] M. C. Gursoy, “Secure communication in the low-SNR regime: A
characterization of the energy-secrecy tradeoff,” in Proc. International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT’2009), Seoul,South Korea, Jun.
2009, pp. 2291 –2295.
[24] R. Narasimhan, “Finite-SNR diversity-multiplexing tradeoff for corre-
lated Rayleigh and Rician MIMO channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 3965– 3979, Sep. 2006.
[25] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. Calderbank, S. McLaughlin, and J.-M.
Merolla, “Applications of LDPC codes to the wiretap channel,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 2933–2945, Aug. 2007.
[26] A. Conti, D. Panchenko, S. Sidenko, and V. Tralli, “Log-concavity
property of the error probability with application to local bounds for
wireless communications,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 6,
pp. 2766 –2775, Jun. 2009.
[27] S. Loyka, V. Kostina, and F. Gagnon, “Error rates of the maximum-
likelihood detector for arbitrary constellations: Convex/concave behavior
and applications,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 1948
–1960, Apr. 2010.
[28] P. Smith and M. Shafi, “An approximate capacity distribution for MIMO
systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 887 – 890, Jun. 2004.
[29] I. E. Telatar, “Capacity of multi-antenna Gaussian channels,” European
Trans. On Communication, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 585–5595, November 1999.
[30] M. Kang and M. S. Alouini, “Capacity of MIMO Rician channels,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 112 – 122, Jan. 2006.
[31] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, A. Jeffrey, Ed. Academic Press, inc, 1980.
PLACE
PHOTO
HERE
Zouheir Rezki (S’01, M’08) was born in
Casablanca, Morocco. He received the Diplome
d’Inge´nieur degree from the ´Ecole Nationale de
l’Industrie Mine´rale (ENIM), Rabat, Morocco, in
1994, the M.Eng. degree from ´Ecole de Technologie
Supe´rieure, Montreal, Que´bec, Canada, in 2003,
and the Ph.D. degree from ´Ecole Polytechnique,
Montreal, Que´bec, in 2008, all in electrical engi-
neering. From October 2008 to September 2009,
he was a postdoctoral research fellow with Data
Communications Group, Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia. He is now a
postdoctoral research fellow at King Abdullah University of Science and
Technology (KAUST), Thuwal, Mekkah Province, Saudi Arabia. His research
interests include: performance limits of communication systems, cognitive
and sensor networks, physical-layer security, and low-complexity detection
algorithms.
PLACE
PHOTO
HERE
Mohamed-Slim Alouini (S’94, M’98, SM’03, F’09)
was born in Tunis, Tunisia. He received the Ph.D.
degree in electrical engineering from the California
Institute of Technology (Caltech), Pasadena, CA,
USA, in 1998. He was with the department of Elec-
trical and Computer Engineering of the University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA, then with
the Electrical and Computer Engineering Program
at the Texas A&M University at Qatar, Education
City, Doha, Qatar. Since June 2009, he has been a
Professor of Electrical Engineering in the Division
of Physical Sciences and Engineering at KAUST, Saudi Arabia., where his
current research interests include the design and performance analysis of
wireless communication systems.
